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Abstract
We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budget-
balanced Bayesian mechanisms. We show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative
expected social surplus are implementable if and only if the probability distribution of the
agents' types satis¯es two conditions: the well-known condition of Cr¶ emer and McLean
(1985) and the Identi¯ability condition introduced in this paper. These conditions are
also necessary for ex-post e±ciency to be attainable. The expected social surplus in these
mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way. The Identi¯ability condition, as well
as Cr¶ emer-McLean condition, are generic when there are at least three agents, and none of
them has more types than the number of type pro¯les of the other agents. Also generically,
any ex-post e±cient decision rule can be implemented in an informed principal framework,
i.e. when the mechanism is o®ered by an informed participant. Only ex-post e±cient
mechanisms allocating all surplus to the party designing the mechanism are both sequential
equilibrium outcomes and neutral optima, i.e. can never be blocked. Thus, an informed
principal can also extract all surplus from the other agents in a Bayesian mechanism.
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This paper focuses on three issues. First, we explore the existence of individually rational ex-
post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms for the implementation of a broad class of decision
rules1, including ex-post e±cient ones. Then we study the related issue of surplus allocation
in such mechanisms. We also explore the issue of implementation in the informed principal
framework where the mechanism is designed not by an outsider, but by one of the agents after
she has learned her private information.
The theory of Bayesian mechanism design provides a universally accepted implementation
tool used to study a large variety of environments, including contracting, auctions, bargaining,
etc. For this reason, it is important to understand the scope and limits of Bayesian imple-
mentation. One of the well-known issues is the tension between budget balancing, individual
rationality and e±ciency which one can reasonably view as desirable properties of a mech-
anism. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that Bayesian mechanisms possessing
these properties could fail to exist when private information is independently distributed across
agents.2 More precisely, Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) demonstrate that such mechanisms
exist if and only if the ex-ante expected de¯cit in the corresponding Groves mechanism does
not exceed the sum of the fees that the agents can be charged ex-ante for participating in the
mechanism. Krishna and Perry (1998) and Williams (1999) extend this result to the multidi-
mensional setting.
This condition fails in many economically important situations. For example, Rob (1989)
demonstrates that public good would not be provided e±ciently. Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) show that in any feasible mechanism the probability of the public good provision goes
to zero as the number of agents increases. With multidimensional independently distributed
types, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) establish that e±cient mechanisms exist only in nongeneric
situations.
Relaxing one of these three requirements makes it possible to obtain positive results. Var-
ious su±cient conditions for e±cient Bayesian implementation with ex-post budget balancing
but without individual rationality requirement have been derived by d'Aspremont and G¶ erard-
Varet (1979), d'Aspremont, Cr¶ emer and G¶ erard-Varet (1990) and (2003) (Compatibility), Mat-
sushima (1991), Aoyagi (1998), and Chung (1999) (Weak and Strict Regularity), Fudenberg,
Levine and Maskin (1996) (Pairwise Identi¯ability).
Finally, d'Aspremont, Cr¶ emer and G¶ erard-Varet (2004) present a necessary and su±cient
condition for balanced-budget Bayesian implementation without individual rationality. We
discuss the connection between their and our results in Subsection 3.3.
Cr¶ emer and McLean (1985) and (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) demonstrate that
an uninformed mechanism designer can implement an ex-post e±cient decision rule, preserve
individual rationality, and extract all expected surplus from the agents if, relative to the
prior, an agent's type contains additional information about the other agents' types. The
mechanism designer exploits this statistical interdependence to cross-check agents' reports,
thereby inducing each agent to reveal her type truthfully without leaving any informational
rent to her. Naturally, such mechanism is not ex-post budget-balanced. The uninformed
mechanism designer plays an important role of a budget breaker. She collects transfers from
1A decision rule is a mapping from the set of agents' type pro¯les into the set of public decisions.
2Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) focus on the case of continuous probability distribution of private infor-
mation. But their result also extends to the case of discrete probability distributions.
1the agents, and may also have to pay them in some states of the world.3 Without imposing ex-
post budget balance, McLean and Postlewaite (2002) and (2003) show that only small transfers
from/to each agent are needed to construct individually rational, ex-post e±cient mechanisms
when each agent is `informationally small.' That is, even if an agent misrepresents her private
information, the state of the world can still be inferred with a high degree of accuracy provided
that all other agents report truthfully.
We study implementation under all the three properties in question - interim individual
rationality, ex-post budget balancing and ex-post e±ciency. Our main result establishes neces-
sary and su±cient conditions for the existence of mechanisms possessing these three properties
in the transferable utility framework. The ¯rst is already mentioned condition of Cr¶ emer and
McLean (1985). The second is Identi¯ability condition introduced in this paper.
In fact, these conditions guarantee that not only ex-post e±cient but all ex-ante socially
rational4 decision rules- the ones that generate a nonnegative expected social surplus- are im-
plementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism. It
is easy to see that ex-ante social rationality of the decision rule is necessary for interim indi-
vidually rationality and ex-post budget-balancing, so our su±ciency result cannot be extended
further.
Intuitively, the Identi¯ability condition says the following. Suppose that the agents' report-
ing strategies in a direct mechanism induce a probability distribution of reported type pro¯les
that is di®erent from the true prior from which the types are drawn. Then there exists an agent
and her type such that, when this type is announced, the mechanism designer knows that this
agent has not committed a unilateral deviation from truthtelling. Thus, for any probability
distribution over reported type pro¯les, identi¯ability allows to determine a non-empty set of
agent types who have not deviated unilaterally. The Identi¯ability condition is generic when
there are at least three agents and none of them has more types than the number of type
pro¯les of all other agents.
To understand the role of the Identi¯ability condition, consider Cr¶ emer-McLean mechanism
as a benchmark. In this mechanism, the principal extracts information about an agent's type
by o®ering her a lottery which has zero expected value if this agent reports her type truthfully
and a negative expected value if the agent misrepresents her type.
If we attempt to use this approach in an environment where an outside budget-breaker is not
available and so ex-post budget balance has to hold, then we have to allocate the transfers from
such lotteries to agents in an incentive compatible way. This creates an additional incentive
problem. For example, designating agent j to receive transfers from the lottery given to agent
i may induce j to misrepresent her type in a way that makes a truthful report by i to appear
untruthful which would cause i to make transfers to j.
The Identi¯ability Condition allows to resolve this issue and preserve individual rationality.
A detailed explanation of our mechanism is provided in Section 3. Here we just point out
that the identi¯ability condition allows to construct an individually rational, budget-balanced
system of transfers that not only gives a negative expected payo® to an agent misrepresenting
her type when other agents report truthfully, but also does not allow any agent to bene¯t by
imitating a deviation by another agent.
Importantly, the Identi¯ability and Cr¶ emer-McLean conditions are necessary. If either
3Ex-ante budget balance can be attained in Cr¶ emer-McLean mechanism if the mechanism designer pays each
agent an amount equal to her ex-ante expected transfer in the ensuing mechanism.
4To the best our knowledge, this term was coined by d'Aspremont and G¶ erard-Varet (1979). Obviously, the
class of ex-ante socially rational decision rules includes ex-post e±cient ones as a special case.
2one fails, then e±cient, budget-balanced implementation preserving individual rationality is
impossible under some pro¯les of the utility functions.
Under ex-post budget balance all surplus generated by the mechanism is distributed among
the agents and is not extracted by the outside mechanism designer as in Cr¶ emer and McLean
(1985) and (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992). So, it is natural to consider how the sur-
plus can be allocated among the agents. We show that generically this can be done in an
arbitrary way. That is, when the Identi¯ability and Cr¶ emer-McLean conditions hold, there is
a mechanism distributing (ex-ante) expected social surplus across agent types in any desired
way.
The allocation of surplus result has important implications for the analysis of the so-called
informed principal problem. This problem arises when an uninformed principal is not available
to design a mechanism, and it has to be designed by one of the agents who has already learned
her private information. In this case, the choice of a mechanism by an agent serves as a
signal to the other agents about the designer's type, and so the equilibrium mechanism has to
balance the interests of di®erent types of the designer. These aspects make the analysis of the
informed principal problem more complex. Mechanism design by informed principal has been
studied by Myerson (1983), and Maskin and Tirole (1990) and (1992) who propose several
solution concepts to this problem. However, except for some cases, the issue of characterizing
the outcomes of this game has not been completely resolved.
We contribute to the study of the informed principal problem by demonstrating that an
ex-post e±cient decision rule can generically be implemented in this environment. Speci¯cally,
an ex-post e±cient allocation pro¯le that gives all social surplus to the agent designing the
mechanism so that each type of her gets all expected social surplus conditional on her type can
generically be supported as a sequential equilibrium outcome and a core solution. Moreover,
only such allocation pro¯les constitute neutral optima, i.e. `the smallest possible set of un-
blocked mechanisms' (Myerson 1983). Any other allocation pro¯le (i.e. an ex-post ine±cient
one or one in which some type of the informed principal gets less then expected social surplus
conditional on her type) is not a neutral optimum: it can be blocked by some types of the
mechanism designer.
Thus, the informed principal problem need not cause any loss of e±ciency. Also, an in-
formed principal, like an uninformed one, can extract all surplus from the mechanism. These
conclusions are su±ciently robust, since they hold in a sequential equilibrium, core solution
and a unique neutral optimum outcome.
We brie°y address the issue of implementation via ex-post budget-balanced mechanisms
without individual rationality requirement. We show that a weaker version of the Identi¯ability
condition - Weak Identi¯ability- is necessary and su±cient for any implementable decision
rule to be implementable with ex-post budget balance. This condition also has an intuitive
economic interpretation relying on the concept of probability distributions of the reported type
pro¯les induced by the players' strategies. A di®erent necessary and su±cient condition for
such implementation - Condition C- has been previously derived by d'Aspremont, Cr¶ emer and
G¶ erard-Varet (2004). Naturally, our Weak Identi¯ability is equivalent to Condition C.
Lastly, the modelling approach in this paper and in the related literature is based on the
assumption that there is a one-to-one relationship between an agent's payo®-relevant type and
her beliefs about other agents' types. Although there may be situations where this is not so,
this approach is plausible in many economically signi¯cant environments, such as competition
for mineral rights where a ¯rm's private signal about the amount of mineral resources in
the ground determines both its expected pro¯ts and also its beliefs about the competitors.
3Similarly, when there is uncertainty about market conditions, a ¯rm's information about the
future demand for its product is both her payo®-relevant type, as well as the determinant of
its beliefs about the competitors' demands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model. Sub-
section 3.1 introduces the concept of Identi¯ability. In Subsection 3.2 we establish out cental
implementation results. Subsection 3.3 studies implementation without individual rational-
ity requirement. Section 4 deals with the informed principal problem. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
There are n agents in the economy. Agent i has privately known type µi which belongs to the
type space £i ´ fµ1
i;:::;µ
mi
i g of cardinality mi < 1. A state of the world is characterized by
a pro¯le of types µ = (µ1;:::;µn). The set of type pro¯les is given by £ ´
Q
i=1;::n £i which
has cardinality L ´
Q
i=1;:::;n
mi. When focussing on agent i, we will use the notation (µ¡i;µi)
for the pro¯le of agent types, where µ¡i stands for the pro¯le of types of agents other than
i. Let £¡i =
Q
j6=i £j and L¡i =
Q
j6=i mj. µ¡i¡j, £¡i¡j and L¡i¡j are de¯ned similarly. In
Section 3 we assume the presence of a mechanism designer who does not possess any private
information. In section 4 we analyze the informed principal problem where such mechanism
designer is not available and the mechanism has to be designed by one of the informed agents.
Let X denote the set of public decisions controlled by the mechanism designer, and let
x denote a typical element of X. Agent i's utility function is quasilinear in the decision x
and transfer ti that she receives from the mechanism and is given by ui(x;µ) + ti. Without
loss of generality, an agent's reservation utility is normalized to zero.5 A (social) decision rule
x(:) is a function mapping the type space £ into the set of public decisions X6. ti(µ) is a
transfer function to agent i, and t(µ) = (t1(µ);:::;tn(µ)) is a collection of transfer functions to
all agents. An allocation pro¯le is a combination of a decision rule x(µ) with a collection of
transfer functions t(µ).
Finally, let p(µ) denote the probability distribution of the type pro¯les. p(:) is common
knowledge. Also, pi(µi), pi;j(µi;µj) and p(µ¡ijµi) denote the marginal probability distribution
of agent i's type, the marginal probability distribution of types of agents i and j and the
probability distribution of type pro¯les of agents other than i conditional on the type of agent
i, respectively. We use a similar system of notation for any other probability distribution
function introduced in the text. We will assume that pi;j(µi;µj) > 0 for any µi 2 £i;µj 2 £j
of any two agents i and j. This condition is not needed to prove our main result -Theorem 1-
if we restrict attention to ex-post e±cient decision rules. Furthermore, it is clearly generic. A
straightforward but lengthy argument which we omit to conserve space shows the following.
If this condition fails, then all our results hold, but the analysis becomes more cumbersome
because we need to operate on the common knowledge partition dividing the type space into
disjoint subsets which each agent knows have occurred on the basis of her type.7
5Suppose that agent i's utility from her outside option is equal to wi(µi;µ¡i). Such environment is equivalent
to the environment where i's utility function is given by ui(x;µ)¡wi(µ)+ti and her outside option is 0. Note that
the sets of ex-post e±cient decision rules and the notions of social surplus are the same in both environments.
6Note that randomization in public decisions is implicitly allowed, since X can be regarded as a set of
probability distributions over some set of \pure" outcomes.
7A description of this argument is provided in Appendix B available at
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/%7Esseverin/mechsupp.pdf.
4In the case of an uninformed mechanism designer, we rely on the Revelation Principle to
restrict the analysis to the class of direct mechanisms in which the principal o®ers an allocation
pro¯le to the agents. The agents then decide whether to participate in the mechanism. If they
decide to participate, the agents report their types and the allocation corresponding to the
reported type pro¯le is implemented.
Our main goal is to provide necessary and su±cient conditions for the existence of in-
terim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms implementing
desirable decision rules. Let us describe these properties formally.
We will say that the allocation pro¯le (x(µ);t(µ)) is incentive compatible (IC) (and so,
can be implemented via a Bayesian mechanism) if for all i and k;k0 2 f1;:::;mig the following
Interim Incentive Constraint ICi(µk
i ;µk0
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(1)
A decision rule x(:) is implementable if there exists a pro¯le of transfer functions t(:) such that
(x(:);t(:)) is incentive compatible.
Interim Individual Rationality (IR) requires the following IRi(µk












i ) ¸ 0 (2)
Ex-post Budget Balancing (BB) constraint can be written as follows:
n X
i=1
ti(µ) = 0 8µ 2 £ (3)
A decision rule x(:) is ex-post e±cient if x(µ) 2 argmaxx2X
Pn
i=1 ui(x;µ) for all µ 2 £, i.e.
x(µ) maximizes ex-post social surplus. Since the principal always has an option to disband
the mechanism and cause the agents to take their outside options, we assume without loss of
generality that maxx2X
Pn
i=1 ui(x;µ) ¸ 0 for all µ 2 £. Finally, IR and BB together imply





ui(x(µ);µ)p(µ) ¸ 0 (4)
EASR simply says that a decision rule must generate a nonnegative (ex ante) expected surplus.
Clearly, this is a very weak requirement. It is satis¯ed by a large variety of decision rules
including the ex-post e±cient ones. Having established EASR as a necessary condition, in the
next section we characterize necessary and su±cient conditions for IR and BB implementation
of EASR and ex-post e±cient decision rules.
3 Analysis.
3.1 Identi¯ability.
We start by introducing a condition which plays a major role in our analysis:
5De¯nition 1 Identi¯ability. The probability distribution p(:) 2 ¢(
Q
l ml)¡1 of type pro¯les
is identi¯able if for any ^ ¼(:) 2 ¢(
Q
l ml)¡1, ^ ¼(:) 6= p(:) there is an agent i and her type µk
i such
that ^ ¼i(µk
i ) > 0 and for any collection of nonnegative coe±cients ck0k








Consider also the familiar condition of Cr¶ emer and McLean (1985) and (1988) which is neces-
sary and su±cient for full surplus extraction by the mechanism designer:
De¯nition 2 Say that Cr¶ emer-McLean condition holds for agent i if for any type µk
i 2 £i,
p(:jµk
i ) cannot be expressed as a positive linear combination of p(:jµk0
i ), k0 6= k, i.e. for any
collection of nonnegative coe±cients ck0k








In the next subsection we show that Identi¯ability together with Cr¶ emer-McLean condition
are necessary and su±cient for BB, IR, e±cient implementation. Although Cr¶ emer-McLean
condition is well-understood8, Identi¯ability is a new condition introduced in this paper. So,
before we exhibit and explain our results, let us explore it in greater detail.
First, let us examine the relationship between the Identi¯ability condition and the notion
of strategies chosen by the agents in a direct mechanism. For this, we need some additional
notation. Agent i's strategy si in a direct mechanism is a vector of size m2
i such that its
(k ¡1)mi +k0-th entry skk0
i denotes the probability with which agent i of type µk
i reports type
µk0
i when following si. Note that skk0
i 2 [0;1] and
Pmi
k0=1 skk0
i = 1 for all k;k0 2 f1;:::;mig. Let
Si be the set of all such strategies si. Formally, Si =
¡
¢mi¡1¢mi where ¢mi¡1 is an mi ¡ 1
dimensional unit simplex in R
mi
+ . A truthful strategy s¤
i of agent i is such that skk
i = 1, skk0
i = 0
for all k;k0 2 f1;:::;mig, k0 6= k.
A strategy pro¯le s ´ (s1;:::;sn) is a collection of strategies followed by the agents. A strat-
egy pro¯le such that agent i follows strategy si and all other agents follow truthful strategies
is denoted by (si;s¤
¡i).
De¯nition 3 Say that the strategy pro¯le s ´ (s1;:::;sn) induces the probability distribution
of the reported type pro¯les ¼(:js) if the type pro¯le µ is reported with probability ¼(µjs) when
the agents follow strategies s = (s1;:::;sn) and the types are drawn from the prior p(:).
Thus, ¼(:js) is a probability distribution vector of size
Q
l ml with each entry corresponding to
some type pro¯le in the natural order induced by the ordering of agents and their types. To
compute ¼(:js), note that for any ^ µ ´ (µ
h1
1 ;:::;µhn


















Further, a strategy component vector ¼(:jk;k0;s¤




i ) in positions corresponding to type pro¯les (µ¡i;µk0
i ) for all µ¡i 2 £¡i and
zeroes in all other positions. It corresponds to the probability distribution of reported type
pro¯les conditional on agent i having type µk
i and reporting her type as µk0
i , and all other agents
types' being drawn from p(:jµk
i ) and reported truthfully. To di®erentiate between truthful and
8See also McAfee and Reny (1992) for an intuitive discussion of this condition.
6non-truthful reporting by agent i, we will say that a strategy component ¼(:jk;k0;s¤
¡i) of agent
i is a deviation component if k0 6= k and is a truthful component if k0 = k. Note that for any







It is natural to interpret the coe±cients ck0k
i in the de¯nition of identi¯ability as stemming








i ). Then the identi¯ability requires that
for each ^ ¼(:) 6= p(:) there exists an agent i who does not have a strategy such that when i
reports some µk
i according to this strategy and the other agents report truthfully, the induced
probability distribution of the other agents' type pro¯les coincides with ^ ¼(:jµk









i ) 6= ^ ¼(:jµk
i ) for all si.
Thus, under identi¯ability, when the agents' strategies induce probability distribution
^ ¼(:) 6= p(:) of the reported types, the principal can identify a non-empty set of agent types
such that the agents reporting these types have not unilaterally deviated from truthtelling.
This interpretation provides a rationale for the use of the term `identi¯ability' to name this
condition.
In comparison, Cr¶ emer-McLean condition requires that no agent possess a non-truthful
strategy which, in combination with truthtelling by other agents, induces a probability distri-
bution of the reported type pro¯les such that its conditional on any type µi of agent i coincides
with the conditional probability distribution p(:jµi) derived from the prior.
Next, let us introduce the following weakening of the Identi¯ability condition:
De¯nition 4 Weak Identi¯ability. The prior p(:) is weakly identi¯able if for any agent i
and any si 2 Si s.t. ¼(:jsi;s¤




In Subsection 3.3 we show that Weak Identi¯ability is necessary and su±cient for budget-
balanced implementation when individual rationality is not required. To understand why
Identi¯ability is stronger than Weak Identi¯ability, note that Weak Identi¯ability requires
that for every ^ ¼(:) 6= p(:) there exists some agent i who cannot induce ^ ¼(:) by a unilateral
deviation from truthtelling, i.e. ^ ¼(:) 6= ¼(:jsi;s¤
¡i) for any si 2 Si. But even if p(:) is weakly
identi¯able, it may fail to be identi¯able if for every agent i there exists a collection of strategies
fsi(r)gr=1;:::;mi s.t. the conditional of ¼(:jsi(r);s¤
¡i) on µr
i is equal to ^ ¼(:jµr
i) for some ^ ¼(:)
(although for some i there is no strategy si 2 Si such that ¼(:jsi;s¤
¡i) = ^ ¼(:)).
The following Lemma further highlights the distinction between Identi¯ability and Weak
Identi¯ability. More importantly, the Lemma will be useful for explaining the necessity part
of Theorem 1 in the next subsection.
Lemma 1 The probability distribution p(:) is identi¯able if and only if for any agent i, any
si 2 Si s.t. ¼(:jsi;s¤
¡i) 6= p(:) and any collection of coe±cients bk
i ¸ 0, k 2 f1;:::;mig, there
exists an agent j s.t. for any sj 2 Sj and any collection of coe±cients bh














7We conclude this subsection with the following lemma which connects the Identi¯ability
condition with the familiar notion of linear independence. It implies that the Identi¯ability
condition is easy to satisfy.
Lemma 2 The probability distribution p(:) is identi¯able if for some agent i and each k 2






jk), k0 2 f1;:::;mig, h0 2 f1;:::;mjkg, h0 6= hk, are
linearly independent.
Proof: See the appendix.
The condition of Lemma 2 is signi¯cantly stronger than Identi¯ability, as one can infer from
the respective dimensionality requirements. Indeed, Lemma 2 implies that p(:) is identi¯able if
for some i and j the collection of mi+mj ¡1 vectors p(:jµk
i ;µh
j ), k 2 f1;:::;mig, h 2 f1;:::;mjg
is linearly independent. For this, it is necessary that
Q
l6=i;j ml ¸ mi + mj ¡ 1. In contrast,
Lemma 3 below demonstrates that agent i is generically identi¯able when
Q
l6=i ml ¸ mi.
3.2 Main Result.
The main result of this paper is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Su±ciency. Any ex-ante socially rational decision rule is implementable via an
interim individually rational and ex-post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism if the prior p(:)
is identi¯able and Cr¶ emer-McLean condition holds for all agents.
Necessity. An ex-post e±cient decision rule is implementable via an interim individually
rational, ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanism under any pro¯le of the utility functions
(quasilinear in transfers) only if the prior p(:) is identi¯able and Cr¶ emer-McLean condition
holds for all agents.
Remark. The necessity part of the Theorem is established for ex-post e±cient, rather
than ex-ante socially rational decision rules because failure of ex-post e±ciency is arguably a
more signi¯cant problem. A careful reading of the Step 6 in the proof should convince a reader
that decision rules that are not ex-post e±cient but are ex-ante socially rational may also fail
to be implementable if the identi¯ability condition does not hold.
To explain the intuition behind Theorem 1, it is useful to start the discussion from a natural
benchmark. So, let us highlight the relationship between our results and the work of Cr¶ emer
and McLean (1985) and (1988) on the surplus extraction by the mechanism designer. Below,
we will also discuss the link to the literature on implementation with ex-post budget balancing,
but without interim individual rationality.
The mechanism of Cr¶ emer and McLean (1988) elicits the agents' private information with-
out leaving any informational rents to them by means of lotteries - systems of transfers to/from
each agent which depend on the whole pro¯le of the reported types. The lotteries are con-
structed in such a way that the loss from a misrepresentation in a lottery for any agent always
exceeds any potential gain from a better allocation x(:). Cr¶ emer and McLean condition de-
scribed in De¯nition 2 is necessary and su±cient for such lotteries to exist.
This method works successfully in the presence of an outside principal who acts as a
budget-breaker, or a residual claimant, for the lotteries o®ered to the agents. In contrast,
in our budget-balanced framework all payments to/by any particular agent have to be made
by/distributed to other agents. Consequently, we must designate residual claimant(s) for the
8lottery given to each agent, which raises the issue of the incentives of the residual claimants.
For example, designating agent j as a residual claimant for the lottery given to agent i may
generate incentives for j to `rig the lottery:' misrepresent her type in a way that makes a
truthful report by i to appear untruthful and, thus, to cause i to make transfers to j.
It is natural to consider the following candidate for an optimal mechanism which allows
to resolve the issue of the incentives of residual claimants. Suppose that we divide all agents
into groups and run a separate Cr¶ emer-McLean mechanism in each group using an agent
outside the group as a residual claimant for the balance of transfers from/to this group. The
incentive compatibility of this mechanism can be ensured by making the lotteries in each
group independent of the residual claimant's reported type. Clearly, such mechanism will also
be budget balanced. However, it could fail to be individually rational for the residual claimants,
because the aggregate transfer between each group and its residual claimant will be determined
independently of the residual claimant's reported type. But, given statistical interdependence
between the agents' types, the probability distribution of these aggregate transfers and hence
the expected utility of the residual claimant will be dependent on her type. In particular, for
some values of her private information the residual claimant could expect a negative payo®, in
which case she would refuse to participate in this mechanism. Therefore, such mechanism would
not work in general. Its failure highlights the role of individual rationality, and illustrates the
di®erence between our environment and the ones with ex-post budget-balancing but without
individual rationality requirement as in Aoyagi (1998) and d'Aspremont, Cr¶ emer and G¶ erard-
Varet (2004). Indeed, a mechanism of this kind is used by Aoyagi (1998). In contrast, in
our mechanism every agent's allocation typically has to depend on the reported types of all
agents, which could generate an opportunity for residual claimants to increase their payo®s by
mimicking other agents' deviations.
To summarize, we need to deal with three issues within a balanced budget framework: (i)
an agent misrepresenting her type in a way which is indistinguishable from truthtelling; (ii)
\Mimicry:" an agent misrepresenting her type in a way which is statistically indistinguishable
from some misrepresentation by another agent; (iii) the individual rationality. The tension
between the second and the third issues was described above.
Consider how these issues can be resolved when Identi¯ability and Cr¶ emer-McLean con-
ditions hold. Under Identi¯ability, if the probability distribution of reported type pro¯les is
^ ¼(:) 6= p(:), then the mechanism designer can identify a non-empty set of agent types such that
the agents reporting these types are surely truthful.
Moreover, since the Identi¯ability condition requires this to be true for all probability
distributions of reported type pro¯les, there are su±ciently many such agent types to cover the
whole type space under any ^ ¼(:). Precisely, suppose that ^ ¼(^ µ) 6= p(^ µ) for some ^ µ ´ (^ µ1;:::; ^ µn).
Then there exists an agent i s.t. ^ ¼(:j^ µi) 6= ¼[(:jsi;s¤
¡i)j^ µi] for all si 2 Si (where ¼[(:jsi;s¤
¡i)j^ µi]
denotes the conditional of ¼(:jsi;s¤
¡i) on ^ µi).
In turn, Cr¶ emer-McLean condition implies that no agent can perfectly `hide' her deviation
from truth-telling, i.e. no agent i has a non-truthful reporting strategy si s.t. sk0k
i > 0 for




i ] = p(:jµk
i ).
Therefore, we can construct a budget-balanced system of transfers t(µ) = (t1(µ);:::;tn(µ))
s.t. (i)
P
µ¡i2£¡i ti(µ¡i;µi)p(µ¡ijµi) = 0 for all i, µi 2 £i, (ii)
P
µ¡i2£¡i ti(µ¡i;µi)^ ¼(µ¡ijµi) > 0 if
^ ¼(:jµi) 6= p(:jµi) and ^ ¼(:jµi) 6= ¼[(:jsi;s¤
¡i)jµi] for all si 2 s¤
i, (iii)
P
µ¡i2£¡i ti(µ¡i;µi)^ ¼(µ¡ijµi) <
0 if ^ ¼(:jµi) 6= p(:jµi) and ^ ¼(:jµi) = ¼[(:jsi;s¤
¡i)jµi] for some si.
9Thus, the system of transfers t(:) always punishes an agent who could have misrepresented
her type unilaterally by giving her a negative expected transfer, and gives a strictly positive
payo® to an agent who could not have done so9.
This implies that t(:) is both individually rational and strictly incentive compatible, i.e.
X
µ¡i2£¡i




i)p(µ¡ijµi) < 0 for all µi 6= µ0
i (8)
To reiterate, is it possible to ensure that t(:) is budget balanced because for any probability
distribution of reported type pro¯les there is a su±ciently large set of agent types who could
not have unilaterally deviated, and who are therefore given a positive expected transfer.
By scaling the transfers up appropriately, the mechanism designer can elicit type informa-
tion from the agents at no cost, irrespective of the decision rule x(:). To these transfers, she can
also add budget-balanced transfers that compensate agents for the utility consequences of the
public decision x(:) and allocate the social surplus without a®ecting the incentive compatibil-
ity of the mechanism. This explains the su±ciency of the Identi¯ability and Cr¶ emer-McLean
conditions.
The necessity part of Theorem 1 can be explained using a similar logic. If the Identi¯ability
condition fails, then by Lemma 1 there is a collection of strategies (s1;:::;sn) with si 6= s¤
i for
















¡n) = ^ ¼
(9)
Let us show that in this case there is no budget-balanced system of transfers (t1(µ);:::;tn(µ))
which is strictly incentive compatible and individually rational, i.e. satis¯es (8). Indeed, since
si 6= s¤
i, (8) implies that ti(:)£¼(:jsi;s¤
¡i) < 0. Also, (8) implies that tl(:)£¼(:jsl;s¤
¡l) · 0 for
all l 6= i and sl 2 Sl, and tl(:) £ ¼(:jkl;kl;s¤
¡l) = 0 for all l. So, if both (8) and (9) hold, then
ti(:)^ ¼ < 0 and tl(:)^ ¼ · 0 for all l 6= i. Summing up, we get (
P
l tl(:)) ^ ¼ < 0 which contradicts
budget-balancing.
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0 and, on the other hand, ti(:)p(:) = 0.
The non-existence of a system of transfers satisfying (8) means that the mechanism has
to provide informational rents to prevent agents from engaging in some deviations. We then
show that the sum of expected informational rents that need to be given to the agents exceeds
the expected social surplus for a class of utility function pro¯les, even though the decision rule
is ex-post e±cient. Then e±cient implementation is impossible. Note that the same logic is
behind the impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). The di®erence is that
in our case the mechanism may have to pay informational rents only to some subset of agent
types (this could even be a single type). Yet, as our proof demonstrates, this could be enough
to make implementation impossible.
9Informally, we can say that Cr¶ emer-McLean condition makes it possible to detect the deviators and punish
them, while the Identi¯ability condition makes it possible to identify those who could not have deviated and,
therefore, could be given the proceeds from punishments.
10Note that Cr¶ emer and McLean (1988) show that their condition is necessary for surplus
extraction in their environment, but not for implementation per se. In contrast, we establish
that this condition is, in fact, necessary for implementation.
With ex-post budget balance, all social surplus generated by the mechanism is allocated
to the agents. Thus, it is natural to investigate how this surplus can be distributed across the
agents and agent types. The next result shows that this can be done in an arbitrary way.
Theorem 2 Consider any EASR decision rule x(µ), and suppose that the prior p(:) is iden-
ti¯able and Cr¶ emer-McLean condition holds for all agents. Then for any collection of
P
i mi







there exists an IC, BB, and IR Bayesian mechanism (x(µ);t(µ)) s.t. the expected surplus of
type µi of agent i is equal to vi(µi), i.e.
X
µ¡i2£¡i
(ui(x(µ¡i;µi);(µ¡i;µi)) + ti(µ¡i;µi))p(µ¡ijµi) = vi(µi)
Proof: See the Appendix.
An interesting aspect of Theorem 2 is that, compared to Theorem 1, no additional con-
ditions are required to achieve the desired allocation of surplus. To understand why this is
so, refer to the method of lotteries described above. These lotteries guarantee strict incentive
compatibility of truthtelling and binding individual rationality for all types. Given that the
expected losses from non-truthful reporting can be made arbitrarily large, the mechanism will
remain incentive compatible even if we add to it transfers distributing the expected social
surplus in any desirable way.
This result is of independent interest because the existence of an e±cient, individually
rational, balanced-budget mechanism does not by itself guarantee that the social surplus can
be allocated arbitrarily. For example, one can show that such a mechanism exists if there is
an agent ^ i whose type is distributed independently of all other agents' types, the prior over
other agents' types p¡^ i is identi¯able and Cr¶ emer-McLean condition holds for all agents other
than ^ i. However, agent ^ i must receive at least some, and sometimes all social surplus. So,
identi¯ability is an essential requirement guaranteeing the freedom in surplus allocation.
Next, we study whether a su±ciently large set of probability distributions is identi¯able
and satis¯es Cr¶ emer-McLean conditions for all agents.
Using Lemma 2, it is relatively straightforward to show that identi¯ability is generic if
L¡i¡j ¸ mi +mj ¡1 for some i and j. However, the following Lemma demonstrates that this
dimensionality requirement can be signi¯cantly relaxed.
Lemma 3 Genericity of Identi¯ability. Suppose that there are at least three agents (n ¸
3) and ¦j6=imj ¸ mi for all i. Also, if n = 3 then at least one of the agents has at least three
types. Then almost all probability distributions p(:) are identi¯able.
In the proof of Lemma 3 we use a measure-theoretic de¯nition of genericity and show that
the set of probability distributions which are not identi¯able has (Lebesgue) measure zero.
11Precisely, the proof establishes that p(:) is not identi¯able only if a set of non-degenerate
polynomials in the entries of p(:) are non-zero. This argument also implies that identi¯ability
is generic in the topological sense, i.e. holds on an open dense set in the topology generated
by the Euclidian metric.
It is easy to see that Cr¶ emer-McLean condition for agent i holds generically when mi · Q
l6=i ml. This also follows from Fact 2 in Step 3 of the proof of Lemma 3. Since a ¯nite union
of sets of measure zero has measure zero, while an intersection of a ¯nite number of open and
dense sets is open and dense, we conclude that both conditions of Theorems 1 and 2 are generic
when the dimensionality requirements of Lemma 3 hold.
The proof of Lemma 3 is quite involved because there is no simple method to construct an
e±cient, IR, BB mechanism. In contrast, if individual rationality requirement is left out, this
can be done by relying either on Cauchy-Schwartz inequality or the scoring rule (see Aoyagi
(1998) or d'Aspremont, Cr¶ emer and G¶ erard-Varet (2004)). But if we take the mechanism
constructed in either of these papers and attempt to adjust it to make the individual rationality
hold, then either incentive compatibility or budget-balancing would be violated.
When mi > ¦j6=imj for some i, then Cr¶ emer McLean condition is not generic for i, which
also implies that i is not generically identi¯able. It is possible to show directly that the
identi¯ability condition fails when n = 2 and m1 = m2. We conjecture that the same result
holds for m1 6= m2. Finally, for n = 3 and m1 = m2 = m3 = 2 we can show by direct
computation that p(:) is identi¯able if at least one of the following inequalities is satis¯ed
(where pk1k2k3 denotes the probability that the agents 1,2 and 3 have types k1, k2, and k3
respectively): (p211p222 ¡ p212p221)(p121p222 ¡ p122p221) < 0;
(p121p112 ¡ p122p111)(p121p222 ¡ p122p221) < 0; (p212p111 ¡ p112p211)(p121p222 ¡ p122p221) < 0.
In this case, and provided that the elements of p(:) are drawn uniformly, 88% of the probability
distributions are identi¯able.
We complete this section by illustrating our results with two examples.
Example 1. Bargaining and Trade. There are 2 buyers and 2 sellers each of whom
can produce one unit of the good. A buyer's valuation is equal to v with probability p and v
with probability (1 ¡ p). A seller's cost is equal to c with probability q and c with probability
(1 ¡ q). Further, v > c > v > c. Let ¢v = v ¡ v, and ¢c = c ¡ c.
If the costs and valuations are distributed independently, then following the method of My-
erson and Satterthwaite (1983), we can show that an e±cient, IR, BB Bayesian mechanism
does not exist if the sum of (ex-ante) expected informational rents of all traders E¼ in an e±-
cient, IR mechanism exceeds total (ex-ante) expected surplus ES. Using standard techniques,
we ¯nd that E¼ = 2(1 ¡ p)q(1 + p(1 ¡ q))(¢v + ¢c) and
ES = 2(v ¡c)(1¡q)2(1¡p)+2(v ¡c)p2q +2(v ¡c)(1¡p)q(1¡q +p). Fixing p;q 2 (0;1), it
is easy to see that E¼ > ES if c ¡ v is su±ciently large compared to both v ¡ c and v ¡ c.
However, by Lemma 3 all traders are generically identi¯able. In particular, let us modify
the joint probability distribution of their types slightly and suppose that the most e±cient
type pro¯le (v;v;c;c) occurs with probability (1 ¡ p)2q2 + ±, the most ine±cient type pro¯le
(v;v;c;c) occurs with probability p2(1 ¡ q)2 ¡ ±, for ± 6= 0, ± 2 (¡(1 ¡ p)2q2;p2(1 ¡ q)2), and
all other type pro¯les occur with the same probabilities as in the independence case. Then it
is easy to check that the probability distribution over the buyers' values and the sellers costs is
identi¯able (one can use Condition G in the proof of Lemma 3 to do so) and Cr¶ emer-McLean
condition holds for all traders, and so an ex-post e±cient, IR, BB mechanism exists.
12Example 2. Public Good. A number of authors starting from Rob (1989) and Mailath
and Postlewaite (1990) have established the impossibility of e±cient public good provision via
an IR and BB mechanism when the agents' valuations for the public good are privately known
and independently distributed. The ine±ciency becomes more severe as the number of agents
increases. We use the following simple example to illustrate this.
There are 4 consumers. A consumer's valuation of the public good is v with probability
p and v with probability (1 ¡ p), where v > v. The cost of the public good is C satisfying
2(v +v) < C = 3v +v ¡² for ² > 0. Thus, the public good should be provided if at least three
consumers have valuations v for it.
Let us consider whether the public good can be provided e±ciently when the valuations are
distributed independently. By IR, a consumer with valuation v cannot pay more than v if the
public good is provided. If every consumer reports truthfully and the mechanism is e±cient,
then a consumer with valuation v must get an expected payo® of at least (v¡v)(1¡p)3. Thus,
the mechanism must generate at least SP = 4(1 ¡ p)4(v ¡ v) of (ex-ante) expected surplus to
cover the informational rents. However, the total amount of expected surplus available in an
e±cient mechanism is no more than SA = 3²p(1 ¡ p)3 + (1 ¡ p)4(v ¡ v + ²).
Clearly, SP > SA when ² is small enough. So, an e±cient IR, BB mechanism does not
exist when valuation are independently distributed. On the other hand, by Lemma 3 almost
all probability distributions of the type pro¯les are identi¯able. For example, suppose that
the type pro¯les (v;v;v;v) and (v;v;v;v) occur with probabilities p4 + ± and (1 ¡ p)4 + ±
respectively, where j±j is positive and not too large, while the probability of any other type
pro¯le di®ers from its probability in the independence case by ¡±=7. The parameter ± measures
the strength of correlation between types. It is easy to check that in this case p(:) is identi¯able
(use Condition G in the proof of Lemma 3) and Cr¶ emer-McLean condition holds for all agents,
and so an ex-post e±cient, BB, IR mechanism exists.
3.3 Mechanisms without Individual Rationality.
Several authors have explored the issue of implementation via ex-post budget-balanced mech-
anisms, without imposing individual rationality. This literature includes d'Aspremont and
G¶ erard-Varet (1979), d'Aspremont, Cr¶ emer and G¶ erard-Varet (1990), (2003) and (2004), Mat-
sushima (1991), Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1996), Aoyagi (1998), and Chung (1999).
d'Aspremont, Cr¶ emer and G¶ erard-Varet (2004) provide necessary and su±cient condi-
tions for balanced-budget Bayesian implementation and show that these conditions are strictly
weaker than the ones studied by the other authors. Their Lemma 1 says that any Bayesian
implementable allocation pro¯le can also be implemented with ex-post budget balance if and
only if the following Condition C is satis¯ed:












i)p(µ¡ijµi) for all i 2 f1;:::;ng; µi;µ0
i 2 £i;µi 6= µ0
i
Using the approach developed in the previous sections, we can show that Weak Identi¯-
ability is an alternative condition for such implementation. Recall that Weak Identi¯ability
says that any probability distribution of reported type pro¯les di®erent from the prior, which
13can be induced by a unilateral deviation from truthtelling by some agent i, cannot be induced
by such deviation of some other agent j (see De¯nition 4). Then we have:
Lemma 4 Condition C holds if and only if Weak Identi¯ability Condition holds.
Proof: See the Appendix.
d'Aspremont, Cr¶ emer and G¶ erard-Varet (2004) have also shown that any decision rule
is implementable via an ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanism if and only if both
condition C and the following `no free beliefs' condition hold: p(:jµi) 6= p(:jµ0
i) for all i, µi;µ0
i 2
£i. Intuitively, the `no free beliefs' condition guarantees that the incentive constraints in part
(ii) of Condition C can be made to hold strictly.
Thus, by Lemma 4, Weak Identi¯ability together with the `no free beliefs' condition are also
necessary and su±cient for ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian implementation of all decision
rules. The intuition for this result is similar to that for Theorem 1, but there are also important
di®erences between the two.
In particular, since the IR constraints do not have to hold, it is su±cient to determine
the set of agents -not agent types- who could not have deviated, reward them and punish
the agents who could have deviated. Weak Identi¯ability condition allows to do so, as it
guarantees that the set of agents who are surely not unilateral deviators from truthtelling is
non-empty under any probability distribution of the reported type pro¯les. Formally, for any
probability distribution ^ ¼ 6= p(:) of reported type pro¯les, we can divide all agents into two
sets: D(^ ¼) ´ fij9si 2 Si s.t. ^ ¼ = ¼(:jsi;s¤
¡i)g and ND(^ ¼) ´ fij^ ¼ 6= ¼(:jsi;s¤
¡i) 8 si 2 Sig.
The set D(^ ¼) includes potential deviators who could have induced ^ ¼ by a unilateral deviation
from truthtelling, while the set ND(^ ¼) includes agents who are surely not unilateral deviators
from truthtelling when the probability distribution of the reported type pro¯les is ^ ¼. Weak
Identi¯ability guarantees that ND(^ ¼) is non-empty for all ^ ¼ 6= p(:).
Therefore, we can construct a system of transfers such that under ^ ¼ 6= p(:) an agent from
ND(^ ¼) (D(^ ¼)) gets a positive (negative) expected transfer, and rewards and punishments o®set
each other to balance the budget. Also, under p(:) every agent's (ex-ante) expected transfer
is set to be zero. Then some agent types may end up with negative expected transfers even if
everyone is truthful. But, nevertheless, each type gets a higher payo® by reporting truthfully
than by misrepresenting.
Finally, the `no free beliefs' condition guarantees that the agents are strictly (and not just
weakly) better o® when reporting their types truthfully.
4 The Informed Principal Problem.
In this section we study an environment where an uninformed mechanism designer is not avail-
able, and so the mechanism has to be designed by one of the agents (referred to as the primary
agent in the sequel) after all the agents have already learned their private information.10 In
the literature this is known as an `informed principal problem.' Since di®erent types of the
primary agent may decide to o®er di®erent mechanisms, the choice of a mechanism provides
a signal on the basis of which the other agents update their beliefs about the primary agent's
type. Naturally, the outcome of this inference process could a®ect the agents' incentive. As a
10The absence of a mechanism designer is natural in many contexts. For example, in collusion context the
parties have to agree upon a mechanism for collusion.
14result, the informed principal problem is more complex to analyze and solve than a standard
mechanism design problem.11
In this section we advance the investigation of the informed principal problem by showing
that generically it possesses an ex-post e±cient solution allocating all social surplus to the
primary agent. The explanation for this result is fairly simple. By Theorem 2, generically
there exists a class of ex-post-e±cient, IR and BB mechanisms Mc1 in which one agent (say,
agent 1) gets all expected social surplus. It is intuitive to conjecture that agent 1 would choose
a mechanism from class Mc1 when she acts as an informed principal. Clearly, agent 1 cannot
obtain more surplus, as this would violate the individual rationality, and getting less would be
dominated. As far as the distribution of surplus, a natural outcome is for each type of agent
1 to obtain all expected social surplus conditional on her type. In this section we con¯rm this
conjecture formally, and show that the described outcome is fairly robust to the choice of a
solution concept.
We start by describing the informed principal game ¡ and introducing the necessary nota-
tion. Without loss of generality assume that agent 1 is the primary agent who has the authority
to propose and implement the mechanism. The timeline of the game ¡ is as follows:
² Stage 1. All agents learn their types.
² Stage 2. Agent 1 proposes a mechanism M which can be represented as an outcome
function M :
Q
i=1;:::;n Si 7! Y from the set of agents' strategy pro¯les into the set of
outcomes Y . Y is the set of all budget-balanced allocations (x;t1;:::;tn), with x 2 X.
² Stage 3. Agents 2 to n simultaneously decide whether to participate in the mechanism.
² Stage 4. If all agents have agreed to participate, the mechanism M is implemented.12
The outcome is determined by the agents' strategy choices and the outcome function of
M.
Let Z denote the set of admissible mechanisms. We will require the continuation game
following the o®er of a mechanism from the set Z to possess a sequential equilibrium for arbi-
trary agents' beliefs at stage 3. This can be ensured by simply assuming that all mechanisms
in Z are ¯nite, i.e. have a ¯nite set of terminal nodes, or a ¯nite set of outcomes assigned to
the terminal nodes.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that all mechanisms in Z are direct, so that
any mechanism M from Z can be represented as an outcome function (x(:);t(:)) mapping the
agents' reported type pro¯les into the allocation pro¯les. The individual rationality of the
mechanism M has to be de¯ned with respect to the agents' beliefs at stage 3 which we denote
by b3
i(µ¡ijµi;M), while the incentive compatibility of the mechanism has to be de¯ned with
11If a mechanism designer is not available, but the mechanism can be designed at an ex-ante stage when no
agent has learned her private information, then it is reasonable to expect that an ex-post e±cient decision rule
would be implemented and the allocation of surplus would be determined by the ex-ante distribution of the
bargaining power.
12For simplicity, we assume that the mechanism is not implemented and all agents get their outside options
if at least one of them drops out at stage 3. However, the outcomes of our mechanism can be obtained under
the same solution concepts if we make alternative assumptions regarding the play of the mechanism following
the refusal of some subset of agents to participate in it. To do so, we can simply de¯ne the outcome function of
a mechanism as a mapping from
Q
i=1;:::;n (; [ Si) into Y where ; denotes an agent's refusal to participate in
the mechanism at stage 3, and the outcome function is restricted to have zero transfers for the agents who have
refused to participate in the mechanism.
15respect to their posterior beliefs at stage 4 denoted by b4
i(µ¡ijµi;M). That is, the individual
rationality (incentive) constraints are given by the same inequalities as in (2) ((1)), with the
only di®erence that for i 2 f1;:::;ng we use her beliefs b3
i(µ¡ijµi;M) at stage 3 (b4
i(µ¡ijµi;M)
at stage 413), instead of her prior beliefs pi(µ¡ijµi).
The Inscrutability Principle of Myerson (1983) says that without loss of generality on
the equilibrium path all types of the primary agent o®er the same mechanism, so that the
other agents do not change their prior beliefs at stage 3. A mechanism with this property is
called inscrutable. The Inscrutability Principle holds because for any mechanism in which the
primary agent reveals some information about her type at the mechanism-proposal stage 2,
there is an outcome-equivalent inscrutable mechanism in which the primary agent reveals her
private information only through her type announcement in stage 4.
The Inscrutability Principle is useful for characterizing solutions to the informed principal
problem and describing the corresponding mechanisms. However, we still need to consider
all possible deviations from the candidate mechanism, including deviations to non-inscrutable
mechanisms. In particular, we have to consider deviations where some, but not all types of
the primary agent choose to o®er a mechanism di®erent from the candidate solution. Such a
deviation would cause the other agents to update their priors beliefs in a non-trivial manner
at stage 3. Their updated beliefs will then be concentrated on the set of deviating types.
The following concept will be useful in the analysis of such situations. Say that a mechanism
(x(µ);t(µ)) is incentive compatible given a subset R of £1 if (x(µ);t(µ)) satis¯es standard
interim incentive constraints of agent 1 given by (1), while for any agent i 2 f2;:::;ng the










We will now introduce our solution concepts. A standard solution concept for extensive form
games with incomplete information is sequential equilibrium. It is well-known that sequential
equilibrium allows too much freedom in the speci¯cation of posterior beliefs o® the equilibrium
path. Therefore, we strengthen our analysis by relying on two additional solution concepts:
core mechanism and neutral optimum proposed by Myerson (1983).
The neutral optimum concept is based on the notion of blocking. To de¯ne it, let fUi(µijM)gµi2£i
be the vector of expected payo®s of agent i in an incentive-compatible mechanism M. Next, let
B(¡) denote a set of blocked expected payo® vectors of agent 1 in game ¡. Following Myerson
(1983), we require B(¡) to satisfy the following axioms:
Axiom 1 (Domination) For any vectors w(:) and z(:) in Rm1, if w(:) 2 B(¡), and z(µ1) ·
w(µ1) for every µ1 2 £1, then z(:) 2 B(¡).
Axiom 2 (Openness) B(¡) is open in the set of feasible expected payo® vectors.14
13Since stage 4 is reached only if at stage 3 all agents have agreed to participate in the mechanism, we can
omit the dependence of stage 4 beliefs on stage 3 participation decisions.
14Here we make a slight departure from Myerson's de¯nition which requires B(¡) to be open in R
m1. Note
that Myerson's proofs of existence of a neutral optimum and characterization results apply verbatim with our
notion of openness. It appears quite natural to require B(¡) to be open relative to the set of feasible payo®
vectors. Particularly, since otherwise it will never be possible to block any point on the `upper' boundary of the




µ12£1 z(µ1)p1(µ1) = P
i;µ2£ ui(x
¤(µ);µ)p(µ)g, where x
¤(:) is an ex-post e±cient decision rule.
16Axiom 3 (Extension) Let ¹ ¡ be an informed principal problem that di®ers from ¡ only because
its feasible action set ¹ X includes the feasible action set X of ¡, i.e. X ½ ¹ X. Then B(¡) ½
B(¹ ¡).
Axiom 4 (Strong Solutions) If mechanism M is incentive compatible given any µ1 2 £1
and there does not exist another incentive compatible mechanism M0 satisfying U1(Mjµ1) ·
U1(M0jµ1) for all µ1 2 £1 with strict inequality for at least one µ1, then U1(Mjµ1) 62 B(¡).
Such mechanism is called a strong solution.
These axioms do not de¯ne the set of blocked payo® vectors B(¡) uniquely. Rather, there
may be several sets of blocked allocations B(¡). To avoid ambiguity, let I be the index set of
all sets of payo® vectors blocked by some concept of blocking satisfying Axioms 1-4, and let
B¤(¡) denote the union of all sets of blocked payo® vectors, i.e. B¤(¡) = [k2IBk(¡). Thus,
a payo® vector is not in B¤(¡) if it cannot be blocked by any concept of blocking satisfying
Axioms 1-4.
De¯nition 5 (Myerson 1983) An IR, BB mechanism ~ M is a neutral optimum if it is incen-
tive compatible with respect to prior beliefs and the vector fU( ~ Mjµ1)g of the expected payo®s
of agent 1 does not belong to B¤(¡).
The core mechanism is de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 6 (Myerson 1983) An IR, BB mechanism ~ M is a core mechanism if it is incentive
compatible (with respect to prior beliefs) and there does not exist any other IR, BB mechanism
^ M such that n
µ1 2 £1jU1( ^ Mjµ1) > U1( ~ Mjµ1)
o
6= ;
and ^ M is incentive compatible given any set S satisfying
n
µ1 2 £1jU1( ^ Mjµ1) > U1( ~ Mjµ1)
o
½ S ½ £1:
The attractiveness of the neutral optimum as a solution concept stems from the fact that a
number of other solution concepts, including sequential equilibrium and core mechanisms, give
rise to sets of outcomes that can be described via some concept of blocking satisfying the
Axioms 1-4. Since neutral optima correspond to the smallest set of mechanisms unblocked ac-
cording to these axioms, it follows that a neutral optimum also constitutes a solution according
to those other solution concepts. In particular, Theorem 5 in (Myerson 1983) shows that any
neutral optimum is also a sequential equilibrium and a core mechanism.
The main result of this section provides a generic characterization of the set of neutral
optima.
Theorem 3 Suppose that p(:) is identi¯able and Cr¶ emer-McLean condition holds. Then the
set of neutral optima consists of budget-balanced mechanisms (x(µ);t(µ)) which are incentive
compatible and individually rational with respect to prior beliefs and possess the following prop-
erties:




ui(x;µ) 8µ 2 £
(ii) 8µ1 2 £1
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µ¡1




17Theorem 3 says that a neutral optimum outcome is generically unique. It must be ex-post
e±cient and allocate all surplus to the primary agent in such a way that each type of the
primary agent gets all the expected social surplus conditional on her type. By Theorems 1 and
2 and Lemma 3, the existence of such mechanism is generic.
In the appendix we also demonstrate how a neutral optimum mechanism can be supported
as a sequential equilibrium.
5 Conclusions.
In this paper we have characterized necessary and su±cient conditions for ex-post budget-
balanced, interim individually rational e±cient Bayesian implementation. These conditions
are a well-known Cr¶ emer-McLean condition and Identi¯ability condition introduced in this
paper. They hold generically when there are at least three agents and none of them has more
types than the number of di®erent type pro¯les of the other agents. We have provided an
intuitive explanation of the mechanisms that have the above properties and shown that these
mechanisms allow to distribute the social surplus between agent types in any desirable way.
An extension of our results demonstrates that, also generically, e±ciency is attainable in
an informed principal framework, and the informed principal can extract all surplus from the
other agents. We believe that our results can be extended to the case of continuous type
distribution, and we plan to address this issue in our future work.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that p(:) is not identi¯able, i.e. for some ^ ¼(:) 6= p(:) there exist
collections of nonnegative coe±cients ckk0





i ) for all i and
k;k0 2 f1;:::;mig.






















i ¸ 0; bk
i = pi(µk















Conversely, suppose that for some ^ ¼(:) 6= ®p(:), ® ¸ 0, and every agent i there exists si 2 Si
and bk









































¡i) = ~ ¼(:)




























Thus, p(:) is not identi¯able. Q.E.D.
18Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose that p(:) is not identi¯able. Let us show that for any agent





j ), k0 2 f1;:::;mig, h0 2 f1;:::;mjkg, h0 6= h,
are not linearly independent.
Since p(:) is not identi¯able, there exists ¼(:) 2 ¢
Q
l ml¡1, ¼(:) 6= p(:), such that for any
i and k 2 f1;:::;mig there is a collection of nonnegative coe±cients fck0k






i ). In particular, choose k such that ¼(:jµk
i ) 6= p(:jµk
i )
(such k exists because ¼(:) 6= p(:)). Then ck0k
i > 0 for some k0 6= k. Thus, for all µ¡i 2 £¡i we
have:
¼(µ¡i;µk







Similarly, for any other agent j, any h 2 f1;:::;mjg and any µ¡j 2 £¡j we have:
¼(µ¡j;µh







Combining the last two expressions and using the fact that p(µ¡i¡j;µh
j jµk











j ), we obtain that for all µ¡i¡j 2 £¡i¡j:
¼(µ¡i¡j;µk
i ;µh





























j ), k0 2
f1;:::;mig, h0 2 f1;:::;mjg, h0 6= h, are not linearly independent. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: The theorem will be proved in a number of steps. Throughout, x(:) is
an arbitrary EASR decision rule.
Step 1. Restatement of the Problem. To begin with, let us rewrite IC, IR and BB
constraints given by (1), (2) and (3) respectively in a matrix form. Let Bi be a matrix of
size mi(mi ¡ 1) £ L each row of which corresponds to a di®erent IC constraint of agent i.
All rows from (k ¡ 1)(mi ¡ 1) + 1 to k(mi ¡ 1) of Bi correspond to incentive constraints of
type k 2 f1;:::;mig of agent i, and each column corresponds to one of L ´
Q
l ml possible
type pro¯les in the natural order induced by the ordering of agents and their types. Then,
the row corresponding to ICi(k;k0) is equal to ¼(:jk;k;s¤
¡i) ¡ ¼(:jk;k0;s¤
¡i), the di®erence of
the corresponding truthtelling and deviation components of agent i. Its entry in the column
corresponding to the type pro¯le (µ¡i;µk
i ) for some µ¡i 2 £¡i is equal to p(µ¡ijµk
i ), its entry in
the column corresponding to the type pro¯le (µ¡i;µk0
i ) is equal to ¡p(µ¡ijµk
i ), while the entries
in all other columns are zero.
To rewrite the IR constraints, we use mi£L matrix Pi formed by stacking the truthtelling
components of agent i one on top of another. The k-th row of this matrix corresponds to
IRi(µk
i ) and is equal to ¼(:jk;k;s¤
¡i). Its entry in the column corresponding to the type pro¯le
(µ¡i;µk
i ) for some µ¡i 2 £¡i is equal to p(µ¡ijµk
i ), and entries in all other columns are zero.




















Construct vectors ¹ ui and ^ ui by concatenating ¹ uik and ^ uikk0, i.e. ¹ ui = (¹ ui1;:::; ¹ uimi)0 and
^ ui = (^ ui12;:::; ^ ui1mi;:::; ^ uimi1;:::; ^ uimi(mi¡1))0 where prime denotes a transpose. Let I be an





B1 0 0 0
0 B2 0 0
0 0 ::: 0






























P1 0 0 0
0 P2 0 0
0 0 ::: 0















































Thus, the decision rule x(µ) is implementable via a BB and IR Bayesian mechanism if and
only if there exists a solution (t1;:::;tn) to the system (15).
Step 2. Necessary and Su±cient Conditions for the Existence of a solution to (15).




where a and b are ¯xed vectors of size l1 and l2 respectively, while S and T are ¯xed matrices
of size l1 £ l3 and l2 £ l3 respectively.
System (16) has a solution x¤ if and only if for any row vector ¸S of size l1 with nonnegative
entries and any row vector ¸T of size l2 such that ¸SS + ¸TT = 0, we have:
¸Tb + ¸Sa · 0:
For the proof of the Theorem of the Alternative see Mangasarian (1969) (page 34). Using
the Theorem and exploiting the block structure of matrices in (15), we conclude that system
(15) has a solution if and only if the following property holds:
Property D. Consider any collection of row vectors f°1;:::;°ng, f¸1;:::;¸ng, ¹ where °i
is of size mi(mi ¡ 1), ¸i is of size mi, °i ¸ 0, ¸i ¸ 0 for all i = 1;:::;n, and ¹ is of size L
such that °iBi + ¸iPi + ¹ = 0 for all i = 1;:::;n; (17)
20Then,
P
i=1;:::;n °i^ ui +
P
i=1;:::;n ¸i¹ ui ¸ 0
In the rest of the proof we will show that Property D holds under the conditions of
the Theorem. So, let °i;¸i;¹ be an arbitrary collection of vectors satisfying the conditions of
Property D. Let °kk0
i denote the entry of vector °i corresponding to the incentive constraint
ICi(k;k0). Note that this entry is (k¡1)(mi ¡1)+k0-th if k0 < k and (k¡1)(mi ¡1)+k0 ¡1-
th if k0 > k. Also, let ¸k
i denote the k-th entry of vector ¸i corresponding to the individual
rationality constraint IRi(k).
Step 3. °i = 0 for all i.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. So, suppose that °
h1h2
j > 0 for some j, and h1;h2 2
f1;:::;mjg, h1 6= h2. Let us show that either p(:) is not identi¯able or Cr¶ emer-McLean condition
fails for j. By (17), we have:
°iBi + ¸iPi = °lBl + ¸lPl for all i;l 2 f1;:::;ng (18)





















> 0, and set °kk



















¡l) for all i;l.
Summing up over all µ 2 £, we conclude that for all i
P
k;k02f1;:::;mig °kk0
i = K for some
K > 0. K > 0 since °
h1h2










K is an element of ¢
Q
l ml¡1 which we denote by ^ ¼(:).








all i and k. If ^ ¼ = p(:), then Cr¶ emer-McLean condition fails for j because °
h1h2
j > 0 j for some
h1 6= h2.




i ) = ¹ ¤ ¸ 0 for all i and k 2 f1;:::;mig.
Step 3 and equation (18) imply that
¸iPi = ¸jPj for all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng
which is equivalent to: ¸k
i p(µ¡i¡j;µh
j jµk
i ) = ¸h
jp(µ¡i¡j;µk
i jµh
j ) for all k 2 f1;:::;mig, h 2
f1;:::;mjg and µ¡i¡j 2 £¡i¡j. Then the statement of Step 4 follows because pi;j(µi;µj) > 0
for all µi 2 £i, µj 2 £j and p(µ¡i¡j;µh
j jµk
i )pi(µk




Step 5. To establish Property D, we need to show that
P
i=1;:::;n °i^ ui +
P
i=1;:::;n ¸i¹ ui ¸ 0.
By Step 3, °i = 0 for all i. Step 4 implies that
P
















i=1 ui(x(µ);µ)p(µ) ¸ 0 by EASR. Q.E.D.
Step 6. Necessity:
21If either p(:) is not identi¯able or Cr¶ emer-McLean condition fails for some agent i, then
there exists a pro¯le of utility functions s.t. an ex-post e±cient, IR, BB mechanism does not
exist.
If p(:) is not identi¯able, there exists ¼(:) 2 ¢
Q






l ) for some collection of nonnegative coe±cients chh0
l . Since
¼(:) 6= p, for all l there exists h1;h2 2 f1;:::;mlg s.t. c
h1h2











l ) g, and ^ ¸h





l ) ¸ 0 for all h.
Then for all l:





















¡l) = ^ Fp(:) ¡ ¼(:)






i ) with ckr0
i ¸ 0 for all k and crr0
i > 0 for some r 6= r0.
Then set ^ °kr0
i = ckr0
i pi(µr0
i ) for all k 6= r0, ^ °kk0
i = 0 for k0 6= r0 and ^ °hh0
j = 0 for all j 6= i, and





i ), and set ^ ¸k
i = ~ Fp(µk
i ) ¡ ckr0
i p(µr0
i ) for k 6= r0
and ^ ¸r0
i = ( ~ F +1¡cr0r0
i )p(µr0
i ). Finally, set ^ ¸h
j = ~ Fp(µh
j ) for j 6= i and all h 2 f1;:::;mjg. Then,
^ °lBl + ^ ¸lPl = ~ Fp(:) for all l. Thus, in both cases we have ^ °iBi + ^ ¸iPi = ^ °lBl + ^ ¸lPl for all l
with ^ °rr0
i > 0 for some r;r0.
Next, let X ´ fx1;x2g and consider the following pro¯le of the utility functions:
(i) ul(x1;µ) = a > 0 for all l 2 f1;:::;ng, µ 2 £.
(ii) for all l 6= i and µ¡i 2 £¡i: ul(x2;(µ¡i;µi)) = a if µi 6= µr
i; ul(x2;(µ¡i;µr
i)) = a ¡ zA > 0.
(iii) for all µ¡i 2 £¡i ui(x2;(µ¡i;µr0
i )) = a + ² > 0, ui(x2;(µ¡i;µr
i)) = a + A, ui(x2;(µ¡i;µi)) =
a ¡ ± if µi 62 fµr
i;µr0
i g.
where A > 0, z > 1=(n ¡ 1), ² > 0, ± > 0.
Then the unique ex-post e±cient decision rule x¤(µ) is such that:
x¤(µ¡i;µi) =
½
x1; if µi 6= µr0
i
x2; if µi = µr0
i
(19)












l ¹ ulk < 0 (20)
By the de¯nitions of ^ ulkk0, ¹ ulk (see (13) and (14) respectively) and x¤(:), we obtain:
¹ ulk = a for all l 6= i and k 2 f1;:::;mlg; ¹ uik =
½
a; if k 6= r0
(a + ²); if k = r0




¡A; if k = r;k0 = r0
²; if k = r0 and any k0 6= r0
±; if k 62 fr;r0g; k0 = r0
0; otherwise
22Substituting these values into (20), we obtain that x¤(µ) is not implementable if
¡^ °rr0

















i < 0 (21)
Since ^ °rr0
i > 0, (21) holds when A is large enough and a, ² and ± are su±ciently small. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Step 1. Fix some agent j 2 f1;:::;ng and her type µh
j 2 £j. Let us show that there exists





vj(µj) = 0 for µj 6= µh
j , and vi(µi) = 0 for all µi 2 £i, i 6= j, i.e. type µh
j obtains all expected
surplus and all other agent types are held at their reservation utility levels.
Such mechanism exists if there exists a solution to the system of inequalities and equalities
obtained from the system (15) by changing all inequalities in its subsystem IR, except for the
one corresponding to IRj(µh
j ), to strict equalities, and leaving unchanged the subsystems of
inequalities BB and IC, as well as the inequality corresponding to IRj(µh
j ).
By the Theorem of the Alternative (see Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 1), the modi¯ed
system has a solution if and only if the following Property D' holds:
For all families of row vectors f°igi=1;:::;n ¸ 0; f¸igi=1;:::;n s:t: ¸h
j ¸ 0 and vectors ¹ :






¸i¹ ui ¸ 0 (22)
Note that Property D' di®ers from Property D (see Step 2 of Theorem 1) only insofar that the
sign of all ¸'s except ¸h
j is now unrestricted.
The rest of the proof can be completed by repeating Steps 3-5 in the proof of Theorem 1.
Steps 3-4, which establish that all °'s are zero and ¸'s are equal to each other, apply verbatim.
The arguments in these Steps rely on the nonnegativity of the entries of vectors °i, but not ¸i.
Since ¸h
j ¸ 0, we conclude that all ¸'s, as well as ¤ speci¯ed in Step 4 are nonnegative. So,
the argument in Step 5 of Theorem 1 also applies.
Step 2. Fix a collection of
P
i mi nonnegative constants vi(µk





i2f1;:::;ng;µ2£ ui(x(µ);µ)p(µ). Let (x(µ);t(i;k)(µ)) be an IC, IR and BB direct mechanism
which implements decision rule x(µ) and allocates all surplus to type µk
i of agent i. By Step 1
such mechanism exists for all i and k 2 f1;:::;mig.









(x(µ);¹ t(µ)) is IC, IR and BB mechanism because IC, IR and BB constraints are linear in
transfers,
P






j ) = vj(µh
j ) for all j and h 2 f1;:::;mjg.
Q.E.D.
23Proof of Lemma 3:




µ2£ p(µ) = 1; p(µ) ¸ 0g is equivalent to an L¡1 dimensional simplex ¢L¡1 ½ RL
+. We
say that a property holds generically if it fails on a subset S ½ ¢L¡1 of Lebesgue measure 0.
Thus, we need to show that the set of probability distributions in ¢L¡1 that are not
identi¯able has Lebesgue measure zero. To avoid operating on a simplex, let us introduce the
following convenient transformation. Consider an L-vector q(:) 2 [0;1]L. To transform it into
a probability distribution vector p(:) 2 ¢L¡1, let p(q(:))(µ) ´
q(µ) P
µ2£ q(µ). This transformation
is a continuous open map from [0;1]L n0 onto ¢L¡1. Although the de¯nition of identi¯ability
in the text is given for elements of ¢L¡1, it applies vertbatim to any q(:) 2 [0;1]Ln0. Then it is
easy to see that, if q(:) 2 [0;1]L is identi¯able, then so is p(q(:)). So we can assume without loss
of generality that p(:) 2 [0;1]L and establish that almost all such p(:) are identi¯able. With
a slight abuse of terminology, we will still refer to p(:) 2 [0;1]L as a probability distribution
vector.
Step 2. Let Wi (Pi) be an mi(mi¡1)£L (mi£L) matrix formed by stacking all deviation
(truthtelling) component vectors of agent i on top of each other in the natural order of i's
types. So, for k 2 f1;:::;mig, the ((k ¡ 1)mi + k0)-th row of Wi is equal to ¼(:jk;k0;s¤
¡i) if
k0 < k and is equal to ¼(:jk;k0 + 1;s¤
¡i) if k0 2 fk;:::;mig, while the k-th row of Pi is equal to
¼(:jk;k;s¤
¡i). Let us de¯ne Condition G as follows:
If ÃjWj + ³jPj + ÃiWi + ³iPi = 0 (23)
for some row vectors Ãi;Ãj;³i and ³j; then Ãj ´ 0:
Comparing Condition G to expression (7) in Lemma 1, it is easy to see that Condition G
implies that p(:) is identi¯able. In fact, Condition G is signi¯cantly stronger. So, to complete
the proof, we will show that Condition G holds under almost all p(:) for j 2 argminl2f1;:::;ng ml
and i 2 argminl6=j ml.
Step 3. Preliminary Facts.
Fact 1. A set f(x1;:::;xL) 2 [0;1]Lj(x1;:::;xL) satis¯es a ¯nite number of polynomial equationsg
has measure zero.















































j ) is a vector of size L¡i¡j each entry of which is equal to p(µ¡i¡j;µk
i ;µh
j ) for
some µ¡i¡j 2 £¡i¡j arranged in the natural order of agents other than i and j and their types.
Also, let M
jh
i(¡k) be an (mj ¡ 1) £ L¡i¡j matrix obtained from M
jh
i by removing its k-th
row. Finally, let Y
j
i(k) be an (m2















::: ::: ::: :::













24Then for almost all p(:) 2 [0;1]L:




ik) has full row rank, i.e. all its rows are
linearly independent, and any of its principal minors (square submatrices in the top-left corner)
are non-singular.
(ii) If m2
j + mi ¡ 1 · L¡i, then the matrix Y
j
i(k) has full row rank.
Proof of Fact 2. We will prove (i) for M
j
ik. The proof for M
jh
i is identical. First, we provide a
heuristic explanation of the argument. Let fU1;U2;:::;Umig be a collection of principal minors
of M
j
ik. All such minors exist because mj · L¡i¡j, i.e. M
j
ik has more columns than rows. The
determinant (det(:)) of Ul is a non-degenerate polynomial. The non-degeneracy follows from
the fact that it does not contain any entry of p(:) in more than one term. So, by Fact 1 the
equation det(Ul) = 0 holds on a set of p(:) 2 [0;1]L of measure zero.





¡i¡j is a pro¯le of types of players other than i and j s.t. µl = µ1
l for all l 62 fi;jg.
Clearly, the set of p(:) 2 [0;1]L s.t. p(µ1
¡i¡j;µk
i ;µ1
j) = 0 has measure zero. To proceed by
induction, suppose that the determinant of Ul for some l 2 f1;:::;mj ¡ 1g is equal to zero on


















j ) is the t-th entry of the vector p(:;µk
i ;µl+1





j ) is the


















j ) = Ul. So, det(Ul+1) is linear in the entries of p(:;µk
i ;µl+1
j ), with coe±cients
-the determinants of the complementary minors- which are not all equal to zero for almost all
p(:) 2 [0;1]L. Since a ¯nite intersection of sets of full measure has full measure, we conclude
that det(Ul+1) 6= 0 for almost all p 2 [0;1]L also. Proceeding by induction, we conclude that
det(Ul) 6= 0 for all l 2 f1;:::;mjg for almost all p(:).





be a collection of
all principal minors of the matrix Y
j
i(k). Part (i) implies that the ¯rst m2
j minors (Y1;:::;Ym2
j)
are non-singular for almost all p(:) 2 [0;1]L.
Now suppose that Ym2
j+s, s 2 f0;mi ¡ 2g, is non-singular for almost all p(:) 2 [0;1]L. Let
us show that det(Ym2





















where r = s+1 if s < k ¡1 and r = s+2 if s ¸ k ¡1, while Y
(t)
m2
j+s+1 is the minor of Um2
j+s+1
complementary to g(t). Importantly, for any t 2 f1;:::;m2
j + s + 1g, Y
(t)
m2
j+s+1 does not contain





j )g . So, det(Ym2
j+s+1) is linear in
25the elements of this row, with coe±cients -the determinants of the complementary minors-






j+s) 6= 0 for almost all p(:). Since a ¯nite intersection of sets of full measure has full
measure, det(Ym2
j+s+1) 6= 0 for almost all p 2 [0;1]L. Proceeding by induction, we conclude
that det(Ym2
j+s0) 6= 0 for all s0 · mi ¡ 1 for almost all p(:). Q.E.D.

















formed by stacking the matrices Wi;Pi;Wj;Pj
on top of each other. Let us modify X
j
i using a series of the following rank-preserving elemen-
tary transformations: (i) interchanging some pair of its rows or columns; (ii) multiplying all
entries in some row (or column) by a non-zero constant.
First, a row of X
j
i is equal to either a strategy component ¼(:jh;h0;s¤
¡j) of player j, for
h;h0 2 f1;:::;mjg (the top m2
j rows), or a strategy component ¼(:jk;k0;s¤
¡i) of player i, with
k;k0 2 f1;:::;mig (the bottom m2
i rows). So, multiply the row equal to the strategy component
¼(:jh;h0;s¤
¡j) by pj(µh
j ) and the row equal to the strategy component ¼(:jk;k0;s¤
¡i) by pi(µk
i ).
Second, reorder the top m2
j rows of X
j
i corresponding to ¼(:jh;h0;s¤
¡j), ¯rst by h, and then
by h0. Also, reorder the bottom m2
i rows corresponding to ¼(:jk;k0;s¤
¡j), ¯rst by k, and then
by k0. Third, reorder the columns of X
j
i by agent types in the following sequence: i, j, 1,...,n,
so that the ¯rst L¡i¡j columns correspond to types (µ¡i¡j;µ1
j;µ1
i) for all µ¡i¡j 2 £¡i¡j, and
so on. It is easy to see that the second and third steps can be done via a sequence of pairwise















i1 0 0 M
j
i2 0 0 :::::::::: M
j
imi 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::::::::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 M
j
i1 0 0 M
j







i 0 0 0 :::::::::: 0 0 0




i :::::::::: 0 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::::::::: ::: ::: :::












Note that the matrices X
j
i and ¹ Y
j
i have the same ranks because the employed elementary
transformations are rank-preserving. Also, there is a one-to-one relationship between the set





i = 0 (26)
where ±h and ´k are row vectors of size mj and mi respectively.
In particular, since the top m2
j rows of the matrix X
j
i correspond to the top m2
j rows
of the matrix ¹ Y
j
i , the subvector (Ãj;³j) ((Ãi;³i)) in a solution to (23) corresponds to the
subvector (±1;:::;±mj) (¡´1;:::;¡´mi) in a solution to (26). So, if there is a solution to (23) s.t.
(Ãj;³j) 6= 0, then (±1;:::;±mj) 6= 0 in the corresponding solution to (23), and vice versa.
Recall that (23) has the following solution: Ãi = Ãj ´ 0, ³k
i = pi(µk
i ) and ³j = ¡pj(µh
j ),
which corresponds to the solution of (26) in which only the k-th (h-th) entry of ±k (´h) is
26non-zero and is equal to 1, and which we refer to as `basic solution.' Therefore, Condition G
holds if the only solution to (26) such that (±1;:::;±mj) 6= 0 is the `basic solution.'
So, to complete the proof let us show that for almost all p(:) 2 [0;1]L the only solution to
(26) such that (±1;:::;±mj) 6= 0 is the `basic solution.' The proof is given separately for two
cases. In Step 5, we deal with the case of n = 3 and m1 = m2 = m3 = m ¸ 3, while in Step 4
we deal with all other cases.
Step 4. Suppose that either n ¸ 4, or n = 3 and it is not true that m1 = m2 = m3.
Fix some type k 2 f1;:::;mig, and consider L¡i £ (m2
j + mi) submatrix ^ Y
j
ik of ¹ Yij which
consists of the columns from (k ¡ 1)L¡i-th to kL¡i of ¹ Yij, i.e. the set of columns which
have submatrices M
j
ik in their `upper' part, and all rows which have non-zero entries in these
columns (which are the rows from 1-st to m2
j-th and from (k ¡1)mi-th to kmi-th). Obviously,
if (±1;:::;±mj;¡´1;:::;¡´mi) solves (26), then (±1;:::;±mj;¡´k)^ Y
j
ik = 0.
So, it is su±cient to show that the row rank of ^ Y
j
ik is equal to m2
j + mi ¡ 1 for almost
all p(:) 2 [0;1]L. Eliminating the m2
j + k-th row of ^ Y
j
ik we get the matrix Y
j
i(¡k). Recall
that j 2 argminh2f1;:::;ng mh and i 2 argminh2f1;:::;ng;h6=j mj. Therefore, mj < L¡i¡j and
m2
j +mi¡1 · L¡i. So, Y
j
i(¡k) has full row rank equal to m2
j +mi¡1 for almost all p(:) 2 [0;1]L.
Step 5. n = 3 and m1 = m2 = m3 = m ¸ 3.





i for all k 2 f1;:::;mg and h 2 f1;:::;mg. By Fact 2 and




i are m£m non-singular matrices for almost all p(:). Hence,
we can assume their non-singularity in the rest of the proof. Then, (26) is equivalent to the


































= 0 for all h 2 f2;:::;mg
(27)
So, (26) has a unique solution i® (27) has a unique solution. In turn, (27) has a unique solution






















To complete the proof, let us show that the principal minors fZm;Zm+1;:::;Z2m¡1g of (28) (Zl
is an l£l matrix consisting of the elements of the ¯rst l rows and l columns of (28)) have non-





is non-singular by Fact 2. Next, suppose that det(Zm+s¡1) 6= 0 for some s 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g.








m+s is the t-th entry in the m + s-th row of Zm+s and Z¡t
m+s is a minor of Zm+s
complementary to bt
m+s. Note that Z
¡(m+s)
m+s = Zm+s¡1.






















det(Zm+s¡1) 6= 0, the last entry bm+s
m+s det(Z
¡(m+s)
m+s ) of (29) is non-zero. If all other entries are
zero, then det(Zm+1) 6= 0 for almost all p(). If there are other non-zero entries in the summa-














































j) for all h;h0 2 f1;:::;mg, s 6= m, and
importantly, the entries of the matrix (M
jm
i )¡1 do not depend on any entries of the vector
p(:) contained in the ¯rst m ¡ 1 rows of the matrix M
j
im. Therefore, for s 6= m, (30) is a
nondegenerate polynomial in the entries (dht) of the matrix (M
jm
i )¡1, with coe±cients which
are not all equal to zero. So, by Fact 1 det(Zm+s) 6= 0 for almost all p(:) 2 [0;1]L. Note that





so det(Z2m) is a degenerate polynomial. Thus, the rank of the matrix (28) is 2m¡1 for almost
all p(:) 2 [0;1]L.
Proof of Lemma 4: First, let us consider the problem of existence of a system of transfers
satisfying Condition C. Using the notation introduced in Step 1 of Theorem 1, this problem
can be rewritten as follows. For all R(µ) 2 RL, we need to establish the existence of a system





B1 0 0 0
0 B2 0 0
0 0 ::: 0














































By the Theorem of Alternative (see Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 1), this system has a
solution if and only if for any collection of vectors ¹ and f°1;:::;°ng, with °i ¸ 0 for all i, the
following is true:




Since this condition has to hold for any R(µ), we must have ¹(µ) ´ 0. Hence, the system (31)
has a solution for any R(µ) if and only if
°1B1 = °2B2 = ::: = °nBn =) °iBi = 0 for all i (32)
28Next, let V s
i = f¯¼(:jsi;s¤
¡i)j¯ ¸ 0;si 2 Sig. It is easy to see that the Weak Identi¯ability
Condition is equivalent to the following: \iV s
i = f®p(:)j® ¸ 0g.
So, to complete the proof we will establish the following claim: (32) holds if and only if
\iV s



































This follows from the fact that vi 2 V s










i = 1 for all k and ® ¸ 0. Now, to the proof of the claim.
\Only If:" Suppose that there exists a vector ~ v 2 \iV s
i s.t. ~ v 6= ®p(:). Then, by (33), for
all i there exists a collection of coe±cients fckk0









¡i). Observe that ci = ~ c for all i.




























i for k;k0 2 f1;:::;mig, k0 6= k0, we obtain that °iBi = ^ v 6= 0 for all i, which
contradicts (32).
\If:" Suppose that (32) fails, i.e. there exists w 2 RL s.t. °1B1 = ::: = °nBn = w, w 6= 0.
Let eL be an L vector of units. Then BieL = 0, so w £ eL = 0. Hence, w has positive and





i ) > 0. Then for all
i,


















So, by (33), ¡w+´p(µ) 2 V s
i for all i. Since ¡w+´p(:) 6= ®p(:), we have \iV s
i 6= f®p(:)j® ¸ 0g.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: By the Inscrutability Principle we can restrict our analysis to direct,
IR and BB mechanisms incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. By Theorems 1
and 2, this class contains mechanism M¤ = (x¤(µ);t¤(µ)) such that x¤(µ) is ex-post e±cient
and each type of agent 1 gets all social surplus conditional on her type, i.e. U(µ1jM¤) = P
i;µ¡12£¡1 ui(x¤(µ¡1;µ1);(µ¡1;µ1))p(µ¡1jµ1), while all types of all other agents earn zero.
Let us show that M¤ is a neutral optimum, and no mechanism where agent 1's expected
payo® vector is di®erent from fU(µ1jM¤)gµ12£1 is a neutral optimum. The proof is by exclu-
sion15. First, by Theorem 6 in Myerson (1983) a neutral optimum exists.
Also, by Theorem 8 of Myerson (1983), if (x(:);t(:)) is a neutral optimum, then there exists
15It is possible to prove directly that M
¤ is a direct optimum. We provide such proof in Appendix B available
at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/%7Esseverin/mechsupp.pdf










subject to IC, IR and BB constraints (1)-(3).
By Theorem 2 any allocation of ex-ante expected social surplus can be supported by an
IC, IR and BB mechanism. Therefore, in a neutral optimum player 1 must obtain all ex-
pected social surplus, i.e.
P
µ2£ (u1(x(µ);µ) + t1(µ))p(µ) =
P
i;µ2£ u1(x(µ);µ)p(µ). For if P
µ2£ (u1(x(µ);µ) + t1(µ))p(µ) <
P
i;µ2£ u1(x(µ);µ)p(µ), then (x(:);t(:)) cannot be maximizing




µ¡12£¡1 t1(µ)p(µ¡1jµ1) for all µ1 2 £1. Note that, because of IR and BB, it is infeasible
that
P
µ2£ (u1(x(µ);µ) + t1(µ))p(µ) >
P
i;µ2£ u1(x(µ);µ)p(µ).
Also, x(µ) must be ex-post e±cient. Otherwise, the value of (34) can be increased by using
a mechanism implementing an ex-post e±cient decision rule.
It remains to show that in a neutral optimum each type of agent 1 gets all expected social
surplus conditional on her type, i.e. U(µ1j(x(:);t(:)) =
P
i;µ¡12£¡1 ui(x(µ¡1;µ1);(µ¡1;µ1))p(µ¡1jµ1)
for all µ1 2 £1. For this, a di®erent line of argument is required. De¯ne a set of blocked payo®




















Clearly, any IC, IR, BB mechanism which is not blocked by [k ^ Bk satis¯es the conditions of
Theorem 3 because there is no IC, IR, BB mechanism ~ M such that
P
µ12£1 U1(µ1j ~ M)p1(µ1) >
P
i;µ2£ ui(x¤(µ);µ)p(µ). So, to complete the proof, it is su±cient to show that ^ Bk satis¯es
Axioms 1-4 for all k 2 f1;:::;m1g.
It is immediate that the Domination Axiom is satis¯ed. The Openness Axiom is also
satis¯ed because the `upper' boundary of the set of feasible payo® vectors of agent 1 is given







The Extension Axiom holds because adding more actions to X may change the set of ex-
post e±cient decision rules and cause an increase of
P
i=1;:::;n;µ2£ ui(x¤(µ);µ)p(µ) and, thus, of P
i=1;:::;n;µ¡12£¡1 ui(x¤(µ);µ)p(µ¡1jµ1) for some µ1 2 £1.
Finally, let us show that ^ Bk satis¯es Strong Solutions Axiom, i.e. a strong solution, if
exists, does not belong to ^ Bk for all k. Suppose that mechanism Ms is a strong solution. Then
for all µ1 2 £1, U1(µ1jMs) ·
P
i=1;:::;n;µ¡12£¡1 ui(x¤(µ);µ)p(µ¡1jµ1). For suppose there is a
type µ0




1). Then in Ms some
type ^ µi of some agent i 2 f2;:::;ng earns a negative expected payo® conditional on (^ µi;µ0
1).
But this contradicts the fact that Ms is a strong solution, i.e. is incentive compatible and
individually rational for all agent types given any type of agent 1.
But then it could not be that U1(µ1jMs) <
P
i=1;:::;n;µ¡12£¡1 ui(x¤(µ);µ)p(µ¡1jµ1) for some
µ1 2 £1, because in this case Ms would be dominated by the mechanism M¤ = (x¤(µ);t¤(µ)).
Construction of a sequential equilibrium in the informed principal problem.
Consider a neutral optimum mechanism M¤ ´ (x¤(µ);t¤(µ)) speci¯ed in Theorem 3. Recall
that x¤(µ) is ex-post e±cient and the vector of the expected payo®s of di®erent types of agent i
30in this mechanism fUi(µijM¤)gµi2£i is such that U¤





Let us demonstrate the existence of a sequential equilibrium (i.e. a collection of sequentially
rational strategies and a consistent belief system) on the equilibrium path of which all types of
agent 1 o®er M¤, in stage 2 the agents 2 to n do not change their prior beliefs about the type
of agent 1 and agree to participate in the mechanism, while in stage 3 all agents, including
agent 1, report their types truthfully.
Since M¤ is incentive compatible given prior beliefs, we only need to rule out deviations by
any type of agent 1 to an alternative mechanism º 2 Z. For this, let us start by considering a
modi¯ed game ¡º which di®ers from ¡ in one aspect: agent 1's only choice at stage 2 is either
to exit and earn the modi¯ed reservation payo® U¤
1(µ1jM¤) or to o®er the mechanism º.
Consider any sequential equilibrium of ¡º (which exists because º 2 Z). Let q(µ1) denote
the probability that type µ1 of agent 1 chooses mechanism º in this equilibrium, ¾º denote the
agents' strategy pro¯le in the continuation game after º is o®ered, and fPº
i (µ¡ijµi);Oº
i (µ¡ijr;µi)g
denote the agents' belief system in this continuation game. Pº
i (µ¡ijµi) stands for the poste-
rior beliefs of agent i in stage 3 after the mechanism º is o®ered, while Oº
i (µ¡ijr;µi) stands
for the posterior beliefs of agent i in stage 4 after the agents have taken participation de-
cisions described by the vector r. Note that for agent 1 Pº
1 (µ¡1jµ1) = p(µ¡1jµ1). Also, let
Wi(µijº;¾º;Pº
i (:jµi)) denote the expected payo® of type µi of agent i in this equilibrium.





1 if W1(µ1jº;¾º;p(:jµ1)) > U¤
1(µ1jM¤)
any x 2 [0;1] if W1(µ1jº;¾º;p(:jµ1)) = U¤
1(µ1jM¤)
0 if W1(µ1jº;¾º;p(:jµ1)) < U¤
1(µ1jM¤)
(35)


















= q(µ1) for all µ1 2 £1.
If W1(µ1jº;¾º;p(:jµ1)) · U¤
1(µ1jM¤) for all µ1 2 £1, then the strategies ¾º and the belief
system fPº
i (µ¡ijµi);Oº
i (µ¡ijr;µi)g support a sequential equilibrium of ¡º in which all types of
agent 1 choose the reservation payo® U¤
1(:jM¤) with probability 1, i.e. q(µ1) = 0 for all µ1 2 £1.
So, to complete the construction we need to rule out that W1(^ µ1jº;¾º;p(:j^ µ1)) > U¤
1(^ µ1jM¤)
for some ^ µ1 2 £1. The proof is by contradiction, so suppose that such ^ µ1 exists. Then q(^ µ1) = 1.
The optimality of agent 1's strategy implies that W1(µ1jº;¾º;p(:jµ1)) ¸ U¤
1(µ1jM¤) for all
µ1 2 £1 such that q(µ1) > 0. Also, by (36) and the de¯nition of Q(:), Pº
i (µ1;µ¡1¡ijµi) > 0




there must exist an agent i 6= 1 and her type µi 2 £i s.t. Wi(µijº;¾º;Pº
i (:jµi)) < 0. However,
this is impossible because this agent type can always ensure herself a reservation payo® of zero
by dropping out in stage 3. Hence, W1(µ1jº;¾º;p(:jµ1)) · U¤
1(µ1jM¤) for all µ1 2 £1.
Therefore, the strategies q(µ1) = 0 for all µ1 2 £1 and ¾º, together with the belief system
fPº
i (µ¡ijµi);Oº
i (µ¡ijr;µi)g constitute a sequential equilibrium of the game ¡º in which all types
of agent 1 choose the reservation payo® U¤
1(µ1jM¤) with probability 1 in stage 2. Recall than
º is an arbitrary mechanism in Z.
It follows that the `informed principal' game ¡¤ possesses the following sequential equilib-
rium. All types of agent 1 o®er M¤ = (x¤(µ);t¤(µ)) with probability 1. All agents accept it
31and report truthfully in stage 3. O® the equilibrium path, if agent 1 o®ers a mechanism º 2 Z,
then the strategies and the beliefs in the continuation game are the same as in the sequential
equilibrium of the game ¡º, i.e. ¾º and fPº
i (:);Oº
i (:)g for i = 1;:::;n. Q.E.D.
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